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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-REQUISIrES

HEm'S

AND VALIDITY-CONSIERATION

NECESSARY

FOR AN

PROMISE TO

PAY ANCESTOR'S DEBT SO AS TO ToLL THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND BIND TE ESTATE--The well-established currents of au-

thority concerning moral consideration are difficult to reconcile with the
recent decision in the case of Glenn v. McDavid,' in which it was held
that an administrator was liable, as such, for the lapsed debt of the
decedent because of a written promise to pay the same made by the
sole heir after the period of limitation had run. The discussion of the
point is unfortunately too brief in the opinion, which cites no authority,
and seems merely to hold that, because an heir has such an interest in
the estate as will permit him to contest the allowance of a claim and to
plead the Statute of Limitations as a defence, he should also be able to
remove the statutory bar as to his interest in the estate.
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that a contract
should be supported by a consideration. A consideration is usually found
in a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. A benefit
to a third person is considered as a valid consideration for a promise
only if such benefit is conferred after the promise was made and in
reliance thereon. A past consideration would support a subsequent prom1 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N. E. (2d) 84 (1942).
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ise only if it resulted in some actual benefit to the promisor measurable
in money. There is, however, an extension of these general rules in
cases where there first existed an enforcible and binding contract, which
had become unenforcible by reason of a rule of law such as the Statute
of Limitations 2 or a discharge in bankruptcy,3 in which situations the
unsupported subsequent promise serves to revive the obligation. Such
a result may be explained either as a revival of the enforcibility of the
legal remedy upon the subsisting original promise, or as a new contract
based only upon a moral obligation to perform the original promise,
although the original contract has entirely ceased to exist. The basis
for the promise is then said to be a moral obligation. In cases of the
latter type, the consideration is found in the actual consideration originally received by the promisor, provided that at the time of the promise
there is an actual intent to enter into a contract.
In some jurisdictions it has also been held that a benefit previously
conferred or a detriment suffered may become the basis for a subsequent enforcible contract if a promise be later made. Such is the case,
4
naturally enough, where a debt of the promisor has been paid for him,
5
where improvements have been made upon the promisor's property, or
where past services have been rendered. 6 The courts often base their
decisions, in cases of this type, upon the existence of the ethical duty,
originally unenforcible at law but sufficient as a "moral obligation," to
produce a ripening into a contract when a subsequent promise is made.
Thus there are authorities holding that a moral obligation will support a promise to pay for past as well as future support of an illegitimate
child.7 But in most cases, the weight of authority is against the enforcibility of the promise based purely on a moral consideration. A son's
promise to pay for necessaries furnished to his father, therefore, will
not be enforcible. 8 Likewise, it has been held that a wife's verbal prom2 Hulse v. Hulse, 155 Ill. App. 343 (1910); Chabot v. Tucker, 39 Cal. 434 (1870);
Hoover v. Wasson, 11 Cal. App. 589, 105 P. 945 (1909).
3 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Beatty, 93 F. 747 (1899); Murphy v. Craw-

ford, 114 Pa. 496, 7 A. 142 (1886).

4 Bevan v. Tomlinson, 25 Ind. 253 (1865); McGuire v. Lawton, 9 Pa. Dist. & Co.
730 (1926); Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516 (1931).
5 Morse v. Crate, 43 Ill. App. 513 (1892); Hayward Lumber & Invest. Co. v.
Lyders, 139 Cal. App. 517, 34 P. (2d) 805 (1934); In re Pohl's Estate, 136 Pa. Super.
91, 7 A. (2d) 14 (1939); Drake v. Bell, 55 N. Y. S. 945 (1899); Pittsburgh Vitrified
Paving & Bldg. Brick Co. v. Cerebus Oil Co., 79 Kan. 603, 100 P. 631 (1909);
Ferguson v. Harris, 39 S. C. 323, 17 S. E. 782 (1893).
6 State ex rel. Morgan v. Rusk, 37 Ohio App. 109, 174 N. E. 142 (1930); Holland
v. Martinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 P. 902 (1925); Viley v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576, 29 S. W. 438
(1895); Root v. Strang, 28 N. Y. S. 273 (1894); In re Simmons' Estate, 96 N. Y. S.
1103 (1905); In re Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 50 A. 943 (1902); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864); Spencer v. Potter's Estate, 85 Vt. 1, 80 A. 821 (1911);
Olsen v. Hagan. 102 Wash. 321, 172 P. 1173 (1918); Silverthorn v. Wylie, 96 Wis.
69, 71 N. W. 107 (1897); In re Hatten's Estate, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N. W. 278 (1940).
7 Hook v. Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371 (1879).
s Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 (1828); Schwerdt v. Schwerdt, 141 ll1. App. 386,
affirmed in 235 i. 386, 85 N. E. 613 (1908).
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ise to her dying husband to pay his note will not be enforced.9 An heir's
promise to pay a legacy which had failed because of an improper execution of the will is also regarded as being without consideration.' 0 In the
case of a widow's note given in payment of her deceased husband's
debt, there is no consideration if the estate proves to be without assets."
A doubtful Pennsylvania case, however, contains language to the effect
that an executor, who has assets in his hands, is under an obligation to
pay a legacy and, therefore, his promise will be enforcible against him,
though it was also said that the defendant could have been held liable
12
in a more roundabout way.
Illinois is in line with the majority rule that "the only moral obligation which affords consideration for a promise is one which has at some
time been a legal duty,"' 3 and that "a moral obligation does not suffice
4
for a consideration unless the moral obligation was once a legal one."'
It has also been said that "to bind a party to a new promise there must
exist the elements essential to a new contract, express or implied."' 5
It is true that, in the case of a mortgage, the grantee may toll the
Statute of Limitations by making payments of interest, since this may
be held to be an admission of an existing liability. 16 It has even been
held by the Illinois Supreme Court that payment of interest by a grantee
will toll the statute both as to the grantee's own life estate and as to the
reversion. 17 This is not a revival of Lord Mansfield's holding in Whitcomb v. Whiting'8 to the effect that payment by one joint promisor is
binding on all joint promisors because the payor may act as agent for
the others. That case was expressly repudiated in the United States by
Justice Story in the case of Bell v. Morrison.19 It was likewise repudiated in Illinois, where it was expressly said that "Whitcomb v. Whiting
has been repudiated by the decisions of this court,"' 20 and, in another
case, that "a just reaction has taken place against the rulings of Lord
Mansfield, which went so far to neutralize the beneficial purposes of
the law." 2 1 But since a grantee may revive the mortgage debt and lien
9 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 128 Cal. 506, 61 P. 94 (1900).
10 Morris v. Abney, 135 La. 302, 65 So. 315 (1914).
11Bank of Commerce v. McCarty, 119 Neb. 795, 231 N. W. 34 (1930); Williams
v. Nichols, 10 Gray (Mass.) 83 (1857); Sykes v. Moore, 115 Miss. 508, 76 So. 538
(1917); Kircher v. Sprenger, 4 Pa. Dist. 144 (1895).
12 Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 33 (1812).
IsSchwerdt v. Schwerdt, 235 Ill.
386 at 390, 85 N. E. 613 at 614. See also on
this point, Hart v. Strong, 183 Ill. 349, 55 N. E. 629 (1899), and Strayer v. Dicker-

son, 205 Ill. 257, 68 N. E. 767 (1903).

14 People v. Porter, 287 Ill. 401 at 406, 123 N. E. 59 at 61 (1919), citing Finch v.
Green, 225 Ill. 304, 80 N. E. 318 (1907). See also Hobbs v. Greifenhagen, 91 Ill. App.

400 (1899).
15 Kallenbach v. Dickinson, 100 Ill. 427 at 435 (1881).
16 Macfarland v. Utz, 175 Ill.
App. 525 (1912).
17 Pinkney v. Weaver, 216 Ill.
185, 74 N. E. 714 (1905).
18 2 Douglas 652, 99 Eng. Rep. 413 (1781).

19 1 Peters 351, 7 L. Ed. 174 (1828).
20 Kallenbach v. Dickinson, 100 II. 427 at 435 (1881).
21 Norton v. Colby, 52 Ill.
198 at 202 (1869).
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in spite of the Statute of Limitations, it has also been held that all the
heirs together may likewise toll the statute because they have an interest in the property and so they are not volunteers.2 2 Such a promise,
however, would bind the property itself and not the personal estates of
any but the actual promisors.
At first glance, the holding of the Illinois Appellate Court in the
instant case does not seem to proclaim a return to Lord Mansfield's
decision since here the liability resulting from the promise applies only
to the heir's interest in the estate; it was, indeed, agreed in the instant
case that all the assets of the estate accrued to the promisor, so there
was no question of agency discussed. However, it should be noted that
the litigation was about a claim made against the estate, and it seems
logically impossible not to conclude that the estate of the original promisor, now deceased, is being held liable simply because of the personal
promise of the heir and devisee to pay.
We must admit at the outset that such a promise is valid and binding as against the new promisor. This we can do only on the basis of a
moral consideration, which can only be found in the purely moral and
legally unenforcible duty to pay an ancestor's debt, a duty which is even
more unenforcible in this case because the Statute of Limitations had
run in favor of the ancestor herself. Should the instant case simply hold
that such a peculiar consideration is sufficient to raise an enforcible subsequent promise, it should deserve notice as being, to say the least,
unusual, and as enlarging the scope of the moral consideration concept.
Having, nevertheless, first admitted the validity of such a promise,
we have no hint from the court explaining by what process such a
promise can bind the original promisor's assets in the hands of her
personal representatives so as to justify allowance of the claim as against
such personal representatives rather than against the new promisor.
We should not lightly infer that the court intended to revert to any doctrine of obligation by implied agency as in Lord Mansfield's holding.
Indeed, even such an inference would not suffice here to explain the
result reached, since the English case went only so far as to allow
agency by a joint debtor to bind another joint debtor, and the relation
of joint debtors can surely not be implied in the present case merely
from the existence of a family relationship.
True enough, in a very recent Illinois decision,23 the executor was
allowed to charge against a legatee a debt due from the legatee to the
deceased, although barred by the statute, but that decision was not
noticed in the instant case, nor could it possibly be applicable unless we
further assume that a creditor of the heir or legatee may hold the estate
24
liable on the legatee's promise, a result which seems hardly justifiable.
Lyman v. Zearing, 187 Ill. App. 361 (1914).
Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 Ill. 343, 40 N. E. (2d) 507 (1942), noted in 20 CHcIACKENT LAw REVIW 277.
24 See also Vater v. Vater's Adm'rs, 278 Ky. 440, 128 S. W. (2d) 951 (1939). There
is, in fact, conflict of authority as to whether a judgment creditor of an heir may
22
23
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Indeed, the present decision amounts to holding the ancestor's estate
liable on the promise of the heir and legatee, which is quite a departure
from the standard methods of collecting debts. The claimant might conceivably have obtained a judgment against the new promisor and then
equitably enforced such a judgment against the share of the new promisor in the ancestor's estate. The method permitted by the decision in
the instant case appears, indeed, to be a most effective way to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, since it allows the creditor to reach assets without
having to litigate or even to allege directly the liability of the real debtor,
to-wit: the heir. It fails, however, to explain the reason why the creditor
should be allowed to begin his collection procedure against the heir by
simply filing a claim against the estate in which the heir is interested.
The desirability of such procedure is questionable.
G. MAscmxoT
CORPORATIONS

-

CORPORATE PROPERTY,

FUNDS, AND

SECURITIES -

WHETHER

DisASSETS HAS
Ri;HT TO REcovER AWARD BY APPRAISERS FIxINa VALUE OF STOCK - The
Court of Appeals of Ohio decided the two cases of Bishop & Babcock
Company v. Fuller and Bishop & Babcock Company v. Kehr,l simultaneously, in an opinion dealing with a novel problem in the field of
private corporations. The first of these cases dealt with the right of the
purchaser of shares, from one who had dissented from a sale of substantially all of the corporate assets, to recover the value of the shares.
The second case involved the right of the dissenting shareholder, who
had disposed of a number of the shares which he owned at the time
that he voiced his dissent, to recover the value of a like number of
shares which he had purchased subsequently. The court appears to be
correct in its statement that there are no adjudicated cases upon the
propositions directly presented in these two cases. As a consequence
of this lack of authority the court limited its conclusions to an interpretation of the statutes 2 which control the rights of the parties. The
pertinent portions of these statutes must, therefore, be considered. A
stockholder who is dissatisfied with the sale of substantially all the
assets of a corporation may, within thirty days of the adoption of the
agreement to sell, state his objections thereto in writing, file them
with the corporation, and, in writing, demand payment for his stock.
Upon disagreement as to the value of the stock, a provision is made
for arbitration. 3 Failure to pay the award makes the amount thereof
collectible as other debts against the corporation. On receiving payment of the award, the stockholder is required to surrender his stock
TRANSFEROR

OR

SENTED FROM

TRANSFEREE

OF

SHARES

SALE OF SUBSTANTIALLY

HELD

BY

SHAREHOLDER

WHO

ALL OF CORPORATION'S

do so much as to contest the will, on which point see 19 CHIcAO-KENT LAW
REViEw 227.
1 - Ohio App. -, 43 N. E. (2d) 638 (1931). For some unexplained reason, the
decision was not published until 1942 in the Northeastern Reporter, Second Series.
It does not appear ever to have been published in the Ohio App. Reports.
2 Ohio Gen. Code, § 8713-7; Page's Ohio Gen. Code Anno. § 8623-72.
8 Ibid., § 8713.
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to the corporation. 4 The Ohio statute. permits the corporation to discharge its debt by depositing the amount of the award with the clerk
of the common pleas court of the county in which the arbitration was
held, such deposit operating as a cancellation of the stock upon the
books of the company.5 The corresponding provision of the Illinois Business Corporation Act 6 is of similar import. On the basis of these provisions, the Ohio court held that the assignee of the shares which were
the basis of dissent could recover the amount of the award, but that the
shareholder who, after having dissented, sold some of his shares and
subsequently purchased the same number in order to make up his complete block could not recover the value of the repurchased shares.
Similar statutes exist in other states. There are variations of the Ohio
and Illinois statutes but they are generally 7 considered to serve a dual
purpose. They enable the majority to carry out the policies which seem
to them best, while permitting the minority to avoid bearing the consequences of the majority's adoption of these rather extraordinary and
unexpected measures. If this be the intent of the several legislatures,
and if the surrender of the shares be required as concurrent to the
receipt of payment of the award, there can be no doubt of the wisdom
of the Ohio decision. It certainly appears that the owner of the shares
at the time of the adoption of the agreement to sell has a valuable
right to enforce arbitration and award, which right may be the subject
of an assignment. It further appears that the corporation has a right
to the surrender of those shares, which were the basis of the dissent,
at the time of the payment of the award. Conversely, the dissenting
shareholder should not be permitted to recover upon shares which he
had later purchased which were not the basis of his, nor any other
person's, dissent. In this way the rights of the corporation, of the
majority, and of the minority are all protected and the statutes accomplish their main purpose.
It may be of some value to consider here the more important statutes of other states. The Massachusetts provision8 applies only to the
rights of minority shareholders upon the sale, lease, or exchange of
corporate assets. The New York sections 9 apply not only to that situation but also to amendments changing the rights or preferences of
shareholders. Louisiana, 10 among other variations, authorizes action by
the dissenting shareholder only if less than eighty per cent. approved
the corporate action and provides for determination of the value of the
4

Ibid., § 8714.

5

Ibid., § 8717.

6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 32, § 157.73.
7 See Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, Perm. Ed.,
§ 5891; 18 C. J. S., Corporations, § 515, p. 1194; 13 Am. Jur., Corporations, § 1216,
p. 1113; also annotation in 79 A. L. R. 624.
8 Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 156, § 46.
9 N. Y. Stock Corp. Law, §§ 21 and 38, subd. 9; Cahill's Consol. Laws, Cl. 60,
§§ 21 and 38, subd. 9.
10 Dart Gen. Stat., § 1132.
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stock by the court. It will be seen that these changes do not impair the
general intent embodied in the Ohio and Illinois statutes.
The hardship upon minority shareholders in the absence of such a
provision is illustrated by the case of General Investment Company v.
American Hide & Leather Company." The plaintiff there was a holder
of preferred shares. The majority, in order to secure the investment of
new capital, found it expedient to authorize a new type of shares with a
priority of preferences, both as to principal and dividends, over the
existing preferred shares. The minority shareholder was not able to enjoin this subordination of his rights as a shareholder and had to continue as a shareholder. It has been said 12 that these statutes were designed to meet the evils created by the stalemate existing in their absence by enabling a majority or some percentage greater than a majority 3 to sell if they deemed it the best policy, and at the same time
protecting the minority if they regarded the sale as opposed to their
interests. The decision of the Ohio court seems to be a definite step
toward the elimination of the evils which still may exist.
M. L. GooDMAN
EXEcUTORs
TENURE-

AND
WHETHRr

ADMINISTRATORS PERSON

NOMINATED

APPOINTMENT,
BY

ONE

QUALIFICATION

MEMBER

OF CLASS

AND
TAKES

PRECEDENCE OVER OTHERS IN SAME CLASS AS TO RIGHT TO ADMINISTER
EsTAT---In the case of In re Marco's Estate' the court for the first
time had occasion to pass upon the preference sections of the 1939 Probate Act 2 dealing with the right to nominate an administrator. In that
case one Frank Marco died intestate leaving as his heirs-at-law a resident brother and a resident sister.3 The resident brother relinquished
his right to administer and nominated one Rose M. Kelly to administer
in his stead. She filed her petition for letters of administration and a
4
date for hearing was set. Notice was given, as required by the Act,
to the resident sister who thereupon filed her petition requesting that
letters of administration be issued to herself. At the hearing on both
petitions, that of the brother's nominee was denied and letters of administration were granted to the resident sister. An appeal to the circuit court terminated in the same result. On appeal by the nominee,
the appellate court affirmed the ruling, holding that the resident brother
had no preference in appointment and the mere fact that his nominee
had filed the earliest petition was of no consequence.
The preference sections of the present Probate Act 5 had not been
11 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 A. 244 (1925).
12 In re Timmis, 200 N. Y. 177, 93 N. E. 522, (1910).
13 18 C. J. S., Corporations, § 515, p. 1194 at p. 1197.
1 314 Ill. App. 560, 41 N. E. (2d) 783 (1942).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 248-9 and 253.
3 Several other heirs at law existed, but they were not members of the same
class, or were nonresidents, so no question as to their rights was involved.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 251.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, §§ 248-9 and 253.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

interpreted up to the time the instant case was decided. Under the
Administration Act of 1872, 6 which was substantially the same as the
present law, 7 much the same question was involved in the case of
Justice v. Wilkins.8 It was there held that an appointee of a person
qualified to administer could not be granted letters of administration
when other members of the same class applied for appointment;
consequently, the nominee, being a stranger to the class, could not be
given preference unless all the members of the class waived their
right to administer. The rule there laid down was followed in a number
of later cases.9
The nominee, in the instant case, contended that this rule had, however, been superseded by the provisions of the new act since the
apparent intention of the legislature was to place the nominee on a
parity with the person nominating him and with others in the same
class. It is true that the act does state that the court may "grant letters to
one or more of them or to the nominee of one or more of them, "10
which would seem basis for the belief that nominee and person nominating were equal to one another. The court, however, felt that some discretion was permitted it and, therefore, it applied the rule of the
Wilkins case.
The result reached in the instant case cannot here be criticised.
The new act, as interpreted, allows the court to use discretion in granting letters to one or more members of the same class or to their
nominee. The mere fact that the one claiming the right to administer
files his petition first, before others in the same class have acted, should
be immaterial. To hold otherwise would tend to promote a race from
the death bed, a situation which was, undoubtedly, not the intent of the
legislature. The decision would, without doubt, be upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court.
C. JELINE
INFANTS-DIsABILITIES

IN

GENERAL-WHETHER

INFANT

IS

LIABLE

FOR

NEGLIGENCE OF AGENT UNDER DOCTRINE or RESPONDEAT SUPERIORIn the
case of Palmer v. Miller,' the Illinois Supreme Court held that an
infant could not be held liable in tort under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The facts of the case are as follows: The infant obtained his
parent's car to take himself and some friends to a dance. While at the
dance the infant was injured and the infant's companion requested the
6 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 3, § 18.
7 Under the older act, brothers were placed in a class by themselves, as were
sisters, the former being one class ahead of sisters In the order of preference.
Under the new act, brothers and sisters are placed in the same class.
8 251 Ill.
13, 95 N. E. 1025 (1911), reversing 158 Ill.
App. 504 (1910).
9 See, for example, Bundy v. Wilkins, 183 Ill.
App. 560 (1913); Bachman v.
Wilkins, 194 Ill.
App. 232 (1915).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 249. Italics added.
1 380 Iml. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 973 (1942), reversing 310 IlM.App. 582, 35 N. E. (2d)
104 (1941).
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plaintiff to ride with him and the infant back to town to a doctor. This
the plaintiff consented to do. Upon the trip the minor's companion lost
control of the car and the plaintiff was seriously injured. She sued
the infant, seeking to impute to him the negligence of his companion.
The court repudiated such theory and gave a decision in favor of the
minor.
2
own negligence;
The general rule is that an infant is liable for his
but just as general is the rule that an infant cannot be held liable
3
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. An infant is unable to
enter into any but a voidable contract at its inception. He can disaffirm or affirm the contract upon reaching his majority, but until that
time the contract is voidable if the infant wishes to interpose the defense
of infancy. 4 The instant case involved an attempt to carry the relationship a bit further. The plaintiff, in attempting to impute the negligence of
a companion to the minor, necessarily must do so through some form
of agency relationship. The court rightly held that, as the infant was,
incapable in law of creating a binding agency relationship, it necessarily
followed that the negligence of his companion could not be imputed to
him.
The courts of other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion
5
based upon practically the same reasoning. There appear to be only
6
two exceptions to the majority holdings. A Tennessee case holds that
a minor may be held liable when the driver of the auto was under the
7
direct control of and acting in the presence of the minor. There is
s
also an early New York case which holds a minor liable for a nuisance
arising from his realty even though he had a guardian representing
him. The theory thereof may have been that the act complained of was
one caused by the infant's own negligence and therefore within the genOtherwise
eral rule that a minor is liable for his own negligence.
2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed.) I, 194, § 66; Thompson v. Bell, 129 F. (2d) 211 (1942);
Fernandez v. Lewis, 92 S. W. (2d) 305 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936); Cunningham v. Ill.
Central Railroad Co., 77 Ill. 178 (1875); Hodge v. Feiner, 338 Mo. 268, 90 S. W. (2d)
90, 103 A. L. R. 483 (1936).
. 3 Covault v. Nevitt, 157 Wis. 113, 146 N. W. 1115, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1092 (1914);
Smith v. Kron, 96 N. C. 392, 2 S. E. 533 (1887); Burns v. Smith, 29 Ind. App. 181,
64 N. E. 94 (1902); Burnham v. Seaverns, 101 Mass. 360, 100 Am. Dec. 123 (1869);
Hampel v. Detroit G. R. & W. Ry. Co., 138 Mich. 1, 100 N. W. 1002 (1904); Wilcox
v. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1, 272 P. 207 (1928).
4 Potter v. Florida Motor Lines, 57 F. (2d) 313 (1932); Swiney v. Womack,
343 Ill. 278, 175 N. E. 419 (1931); Welch v.King, 279 Mass. 445, 181 N. E. 846 (1932);
Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corporation, 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726,
90 A. L. R. 1437 (1934); Campbell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 307 Pa. 365, 161 A. 310
(1932); Andrews v. Floyd, 114 W. Va. 96, 170 S. E. 897 (1933).
5 See cases listed in notes 2 and 3, ante.
6 Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W. (2d) 828 (1939).
7 In the instant case, the question whether the driver was acting under the control of the minor while in his presence was not discussed by the court.
8 McCabe v. O'Connor, 38 N. Y. S.572 (1896), affirmed in 162 N. Y. 600, 57 N. E.
1116 (1900).
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the view would seem to be contrary to the majority of holdings in other
jurisdictions.
While this is the first time the Illinois Supreme Court has directly
passed upon the question here involved, the result was anticipated, for
the court is but carrying to a logical conclusion the results reached in
prior decisions involving the liability of an infant in tort. 9

P. M.
JUDGMENTs-AcTIONs

ON

JUDGMENTS-WHETHER

INTEREST

HICKMAN
ON

A

JUDG-

MENT IS PART OF IT WITH REGARD TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION-Recently
a writer, in commenting on a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court,'
expressed the hope that the effect of such decision would be confined to
cases of that restricted nature, i.e. those in which the principal amount
of the judgment has been paid so that the claim for interest thereon
could be treated as a separate demand. Apparently the hope expressed
has received fortification by the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court
in the case of People ex rel. 1111 North La Salle Corporation v. City of
Chicago.2 In that case, a mandamus proceeding was brought to compel
the City of Chicago to pay a judgment rendered in 1930 in certain condemnation proceedings together with all accumulated interest thereon.
The trial court, in granting the writ, ordered the principal of the judgment paid, but denied the prayer for interest on the ground the same
was barred by the five-year statute of limitation.3 On appeal from the
portion of the judgment which denied the claim for interest, the Appellate Court indicated there was a clear distinction between the instant
case and the situation found in the Blakeslee and related cases, consequently it regarded itself free to pronounce a different decision. It held
that the relator's claim for interest was to be regarded as an integral
part of the judgment and could not be deemed barred before the principal claim itself was extinguished.
Problems of this nature have arisen by reason of the financial difficulties experienced by the municipalities of the state during the depression years. Judgments rendered against them, whether based on condemnation proceedings or other forms of claim, have been left unpaid
until the judgment creditor has been compelled to resort to judicial
action. In the fear that collection would be difficult or long drawn out,
the judgment creditor has often, though with reluctance, accepted the
principal sum due. No regard for its obligation to pay interest 4 has been
expressed by the municipal judgment debtor until, following such tardy
9 Wilson v. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51 (1871); Cunningham v. Ill. Central Railroad Co.,
77 Ill. 178 (1875); Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 265 Ill. 331, 106 N. E. 837
(1914); Perelson v. Podolsky, 191 I1. App. 589 (1915); McDonald v. City of Spring
Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476 (1918); Hunter v. Egolf Motor Co., 268 Ill. App. 1
(1932).
1 Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N. E. (2d)
1 (1938), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REViEw 189.
2 316 IM. App. 66, 43 N. E. (2d) 691 (1942).
3 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16.
4 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 74, § 3.
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payment of the principal, a suit is instituted to collect the same. To
defeat such action the municipality has then sought refuge in the defense
of the statute of limitation, and has succeeded, at least in claims arising
through condemnation proceedings, in convincing the Illinois Supreme
5
Court that the short statute of limitation should apply. It is a matter of
some doubt whether, by these decisions, the court was announcing a
new rule of law, or merely creating a special exception to recognized
principles when applied to claims for interest on condemnation awards.
If the former, it is submitted the new rule is illogical and unsound; if
the latter, the decision in the instant case serves notice that the exception so created will not be enlarged.
On the general subject, it may be noted that a judgment at common
law did not draw interest, 6 hence any present provision therefore is
purely statutory in origin. 7 If the legislature, in enacting such statute,
intended to create an additional remedy for the judgment creditor, there
is no doubt that, absent any special provision, the language of Section 16
of the Limitation Act s would control. But all statutes enacted are presumed to be in aid of the common law unless the contrary appears, 9
hence usually result in expanding the scope of the ancient rights and
remedies rather than in the creation of new ones. 10 Unless special limitations are placed on the expanded right, it would naturally follow that
the former limitation should continue unchanged, since only one, though
now larger, basis for recovery exists.
Those courts which have had occasion to deal with the problem up
until recently, have been unanimous in the view that the claim for interest on a judgment is so integral a part of the judgment that execution
will lie to collect the same without separate action being necessary,"
and that the interest claim is not barred prior to the time when the
major claim is outlawed. 12 Such a view at least possesses the merit of
being a logical application of fundamental principles to preserve sym5 Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N. E. (2d)
1 (1938); Cohen v. City of Chicago, 377 Ill. 221, 36 N. E. (2d) 220 (1941); Hibbard,
Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 614, 19 N. E. (2d) 625 (1939).
6 Schwitters v. Springer, 236 Ill. 271, 86 N. E. 102 (1908); Totten v. Totten, 294
IlL 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920).
7 Feldman v. City of Chicago, 363 II. 247, 2 N. E. (2d) 102 (1936).
8 I1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 16 applies to "all civil actions not otherwise
provided for." When the legislature created the new remedy for wrongful death,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 70, § 1, they expressly provided that suits brought should
be instituted "within one year after the death of such person." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 70, § 2. It follows that, when providing for interest on a judgment, the legislature might have placed a special limitation thereon if they had seen fit so to do.
9 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. McCrea, 106 Ill. 281 (1882.); Kosicki v. S. A.
Healy Co., 380 Ill. 298, 44 N. E. (2d) 27 (1942).
10 Payne v. New York, Susquehanna & Western R. Co., 201 N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. 19
(1911).
11 See Johnson v. Tuttle, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 315 (1863); Foakes v. Beer, 9 A. C.
605 (1884).
12 Dickson v. Epling, 170 Ill. 329, 48 N. E. 1001 (1897). See also Tracey, Receiver
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metry in the law. Departure from it, in the Blakeslee case, may well be
lamented, but, if the decision in the instant case should stand, it will have
R. C. NELsoN
served to minimize the exception thereby created.

FOR

MEcHAmcs' LIENs - RiGHT TO LIEN - WHETHER A STATUTE PROVIDING
LIEN FOR MATEPLIAs UsEr 3N FORM WORK Is CoNsTrruTIONA-

In the case of Douglas Lumber Company v. Chicago Home for Incurables,' the plaintiff was a material-man supplying lumber for forms to
be used in concrete construction on property being remodeled under a
contract between a sublessee of the premises, with the consent of the
owner, and the general contractor. The plaintiff, having a balance of
his account unpaid, sued to foreclose a lien upon the real estate under
the provisions of Section 21 of the Illinois Mechanics' Lien Act. 2 Objection to such relief was predicated on the ground that: (1) the statute
relied on was unconstitutional, and (2) that the sub-contractor, through
whom plaintiff claimed, was not licensed as required by city ordinance.
The trial court nevertheless entered a decree as prayed for and, on
appeal to the Supreme Court, because a constitutional question was involved, the same was affirmed.
Two questions in the case are deserving of note. The first concerns
the constitutionality of Section 21 of the Illinois Mechanics' Lien Act. It
was urged by appellant that the statute in question was objectionable
because it was vague, indefinite, and discriminatory. The alleged uncertainty arose out of the types and kinds of material which were to furnish the basis for the lien; the alleged discrimination existed between
material-men furnishing material for concrete forms or form work and
those furnishing other kinds of material used in the construction of the
improvement. A further discrimination was claimed to exist in that, in
the case of one furnishing the form work, there was no requirement
that a contract be shown to form the basis for the lien, while in the case
of one furnishing other kinds of material it was essential that a contract between the owner and the contractor be established.
Prior to the revision of the Mechanics' Lien Act of 1895, s it was well
settled that unless the materials were "actually used" in the construction
of the building no lien would attach. 4 In the revision of that year,
Section 7 provided that a lien should not be defeated for lack of proof
that the material actually entered into construction, it being sufficient
v. Shanley, 311 Ill. App. 529 at 539, 36 N.E. (2d) 753 at 757 (1941) where the court

stated: "Interest on a judgment does not accrue at any one certain date but its
accrual is from day to day, and the accruing interest is not separated from the
judgment and the statute of limitations does not run against it until the judgment
itself is barred by the statute." The judgment itself is not barred until twenty
years after its rendition. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 83, § 24b.
1 380 Ill. 87, 43 N.E. (2d) 535 (1942).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 82, § 21.
8 Laws 1895, p. 229, § 7.
4 Compound Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 169 Ill. 343, 48 N.E. 472 (1897); Hunter v.
Blanchard, 18 Ill. 318 (1857).
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that the same be delivered for the purpose of being so used. In 1912,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that Section 7 did not extend
to include materials not incorporated in the finished structure. 5 In 1913
therefore, another amendment was made providing for a lien for every
person who "shall furnish any material to be employed in the process of construction as a means for assisting in the erection of the building or improvement in what is commonly termed form or form work
where concrete, cement, or like material is used in whole or in part. ..",
It is this amendment which was under attack in the instant case. The
court pointed out that the words of the act were to be given a reasonable interpretation and held, upon the authority of Von Platen & Dick
v. Winterbotham, 7 that any claim for lien must find support in a valid
contract, express or implied, for the making of the improvement. Once
the original contract is established the sub-contractor furnishing material
of any sort need only show that such material was expressly or impliedly
necessary to the completion of the original contract. In so holding, the
court did no more than extend the authority of that case to cover material-men furnishing forms or form work where concrete and like materials are used in any improvement. It should be noted that, prior to
the decision in the Von Platen case, the court had held that the lien
of a sub-contractor depended upon his own conduct and had no relation to the original contract.8 It would seem, therefore, that the rule in
the Von Platen case, as extended, is now the settled law of the state.
The second argument to defeat the lien was predicated on the
fact that plaintiff had furnished the material in question to a mason
sub-contractor who had failed to procure a license as required by the
oidinances of the City of Chicago, 9 hence, since the contract between
the general contractor and the mason was void as against public
policy, no lien could be based thereon. The court held, however, that
the ordinance was not such as to make the contract invalid, but was
merely a licensing device. It distinguished between ordinances and
5 Rittenhouse & Embree Co. v. F. E. Brown & Co., 254 Ill. 549, 98 N.E. 971
(1912).
6 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 82, § 21.
7 203 Ill.
198, 67 N.E. 843 (1903). See also Kelly v. Johnson, 251 Ill.
135, 95 N.E.
1068 (1911); Williams v. Rittenhouse & Embree Co., 198 Ill.
602, 64 N.E. 995
(1902).
S Keeley Brewing Co. v. Neubauer Decorating Co., 194 Il. 580, 62 N.E. 923
(1902).
9 Municipal-Code of the City of Chicago, 1939, Ch. 151, § 2, provides that: "Any
person engaged in, or desiring to engage in, the business of masonry or mason
work, either as contractor, sub-contractor, or employing mason, in the city, shall
submit to an examination and shall obtain a license as a mason contractor or
employing mason .. " Ch. 151, § 7, further states: "In case any mason work
on any such building or structure shall be performed by any contractor or employing mason not licensed as herein provided, such permit shall be revoked, and
the masonry work on such building or structure shall be stopped by order of the
head of the department charged with the enforcement of the provisions of this
code pertaining thereto, and the person performing such work and the person
having such work done shall be subject to the penalty hereinafter prescribed."
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statutes prohibiting the unlicensed doing of an act and those merely
providing a penalty for such conduct. It pointed out that the question
was one between the city and the mason, and had no effect upon the
contract, and the failure of the mason sub-contractor to obtain the
license did not invalidate the plaintiff's claim for materials furnished.
The decision of the court on this question is made without the citation
of precedent. It would seem that the plaintiff was charged with no
actual notice of the absence of the license, nor does it appear that any
constructive notice of this fact could be urged. If no duty rested upon
him to investigate the validity of the contract, it would seem that the
plaintiff's claim should not be defeated, he having furnished material
in good faith and without notice of any claimed illegality in the mason
sub-contractor's contract.
The court did not decide what seems to be a material question on
these facts: that is, assuming a failure on the part of the mason subcontractor to obtain a license, should this affect his right to maintain
a lien claim? The court has intimated that the failure of the mason
sub-contractor to obtain a license would not bar any claim he might
assert. It is believed the court did not intend this result, for the court
has held in prior cases that statutes regulating a trade, profession or
business are public policy statutes and that contracts made in violation
of their provisions are illegal and unenforcible.10 It is true on the other
hand that licensing statutes for revenue only do not have such effect.'
It has also been decided that municipalities are without power to enact
ordinances purely for revenue but that all licensing ordinances must find
validity in the power of the city to regulate the business licensed. 12 On
this' reasoning, therefore, it should follow that any valid licensing ordinance of a city must be held to be regulatory legislation. As such, a
question of public policy becomes involved and a contract made in violation of the ordinance should be regarded just as illegal between the
parties as it would if made in violation of a statute. Though an innocent
material-man should not be denied a lien, it would seem unjust to grant
such a beneficient remedy to a contractor or sub-contractor whose own
R. C. VOGEL
fault is involved.
- MORTGAGE-REDEmPTION-OPERATION

AND

EFFECT OF DEFIcIENcY

JUDG-

MENT--In Johnson v. Zahn' the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to determine for the first time whether. or not the purchaser of the mortgagor's statutory right of redemption, after foreclosure, sale and de10 Cooper v. Schoeberlein, 247 Ill. App. 147 (1928); Western Cold Storage Co. v.
Estate of Kaufman, 204 Ill. App. 477 (1917); Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 F. 545 (1907);
13 C.J. 423; 12 Am. Jur. 658; Love, Mechanic's Liens, § 164. That the prohibition may be implied, see Bartlet and Viner, 4 Will. & Mar. R. B., Skin. 322, 90
Eng. Rep. 144 (1692).
11 Anson, Contracts, § 279; 13 C. J. 423; 12 Am. Jur. 658.
12 Aberdeen-Franklin Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 315 Ill. 99, 145 N.E. 613
(1924); Barnard & Miller v. City of Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N.E. 384 (1925).
1 380 Ill. 320, 44 N.E. (2d) 15 (1942).
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ficiency decree, who redeems within the statutory period takes the
land free of any incumbrance by reason of the deficiency decree. The
occasion arose from the following set of facts: Plaintiff was the holder
of a promissory note secured by a trust deed on the premises involved in the suit. A decree of foreclosure and sale was entered, the
premises were sold to plaintiff and a certificate of purchase was delivered to her on October 6, 1936. A few days later a deficiency judgment
was entered against the mortgagor in favor of the plaintiff for the
balance of the note over and above the amount realized on the sale.
On April 5, 1937, within the period of redemption, the mortgagor, by
quit-claim deed, conveyed his interest to defendant who redeemed. The
certificate of redemption was recorded. Later the sheriff levied execution of plaintiff's judgment on the real estate and sold it to the plaintiff,
delivering to her a deed therefor. Plaintiff then brought this ejectment
action. On appeal, judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
The plaintiff argued that a deficiency decree is to be considered
as a judgment at law 2 and is, therefore, a lien on all property of the debtor,
and that, since the statutory right of redemption is an interest in real
estate, the judgment is a lien on that interest and goes with it into the
hands of the mortgagor's grantee after sale. She contended that the
redemption provisions of the statute do not prevent the lien of the deficiency decree from attaching but only suspend its operation during
the period of redemption. It was further argued that since the lien of
the deficiency decree would have attached to the land had the mortgagor redeemed, it must attach to the land when the mortgagor's grantee, after sale, redeems.
The court, however, decided that, since no lien under the deficiency
decree existed as to this piece of property during the period of redemption, the grantee took at a time when there was no lien and his
rights were not subject to the lien of a judgment which ran only against
the mortgagor personally. The court pointed out that the rule that no
lien exists during the period of redemption was a rule of property in
3
this state of long standing and hence ought to be adhered to. The
result of the holding is that the purchaser of a mortgagor's statutory
right of redemption after foreclosure sale and deficiency decree takes,
upon redemption, the property free from any incumbrance by reason
of the deficiency decree.
The result is not unexpected and is desirable in view of the fact
1941, Ch. 22, § 44.
Smith, 375 Ill. 59, 30 N.E. (2d) 624 (1940), which was a case
where there was a transfer of the equity of redemption to another before foreclosure sale and deficiency decree, and the action was one to set aside the
transfer on ground of fraud. The case relied on Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 29
N.E. 563 (1892), where the controversy was between the assignee of a junior
mortgagee and the senior mortgagee, and there was no deficiency decree. That
case in turn relied on Seligman v. Laubheimer, 58 Ill. 124 (1871), where again the
controversy was not between senior mortgagee and grantee of mortgagor, but
between senior and junior mortgagees.
2 1. Rev. Stat.
8 See Gaskin v.
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that property rights have been established with this result anticipated
by most of the bar in this state, but it would be more satisfying if the
present decision had been more logical. The court did not fairly meet
the plaintiff's contention that the statutory right of redemption is an
interest in land and, therefore, subject to the lien of the deficiency
decree, and the cases it relied on are not entirely persuasive. 4 If the
right of redemption is an interest in land it would seem that the court
reached an erroneous result since the Mortgages "Act5 makes deficiency
decrees the same as other decrees for the payment of money. By the
Chancery Act 6 these decrees are made liens on all lands just the same
as are judgments at law, which, by the Judgment statute, 7 are to be
regarded as liens on any real estate of the judgment debtor, including
lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all legal and equitable rights and
interests therein and thereto. If the right of redemption is an interest
in land, the statute would seem to require a holding that the deficiency
decree is a lien against it. Therefore the court must have assumed
that the right of redemption was some species of personal property and
hence not subject to the lien until actual possession was taken. Had the
mortgagor himself redeemed, the lien of the deficiency decree would
attach to the land, not because it was a lien on the right of redemption, but because the mortgagor would then own the property and it
would be subject to the lien as would any of his real estate.
That the right of redemption is not an estate in land is plainly
stated in an earlier appellate court case in these words: "This 'right
of redemption' is not real estate . . . is not an estate, but a mere
privilege. . . ."s Such language accords with the older view that a
mortgage was a conveyance upon a condition subsequent, the title to
the land being vested in the mortgagee until payment of the debt. Upon
failure to pay according to the terms of the grant, such title became
absolute in the mortgagee. With the recognition of the idea that the
present-day mortgage more nearly constitutes but a lien, title remaining in the mortgagor until destroyed by a completed foreclosure, such
expressions tend to lose value. Moreover it is a little ridiculous to say
that this statutory right is personal property in view of the fact that
such interest is usually transferred by quit-claim deed or other form
of conveyance signifying a real estate transfer. The result reached,
however, is consistent with authority found in some of the compilations of the law and in at least one other jurisdiction. 9 Yet there are
cases in other states, and some statements in the treatises, to the effect that the statutory right to redeem after foreclosure is an interest
in real estate and hence should be subject to the lien of a judgment.10
4

See note 3, supra.

6 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 22, § 44.

5 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 95, § 17.

7 ]l. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, §§ 1, 3, and 10.
s People v. Barrett, 165 In. App. 94 at 98 (1911).
9 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 328; Morsell v. First Nat. Bank, 91 U.S. 356, 23
,..Ed. 436 (1876). See also 30 A.L.R. 524.
10 Atwater v. Manchester Savings Bank, 45 Minn. 341, 48 N.W. 187, 12 L.R.A.
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There are, perhaps, at least two other considerations leading to an
approval of the result reached in the instant case, although it may not
seem entirely logical. One is that it seems to promote the legislative
intent to give the mortgagor a year in which to be able to redeem.
Burdening his right with a judgment lien would tend to defeat this
end. Then too, the equitable doctrine of marshalling of assets, which
apparently had an effect on the judgment and redemption provisions of
the statute," aims to make the land pay as many of the debtor's creditors as possible. 12 This end is also promoted by the result, since it
gives other creditors of the mortgagor some opportunity to get at least
part of their debts out of the land. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the court in the instant case pointed out that the mortgagor's
grantee would not take free from the lien of the deficiency decree
where it could be shown that he redeemed for the benefit of the mortgagor.
G. ADL
WoRKMEN's

COMPENSATIoN-NoTICE

or

ACCIDENT OR

INJURY-WHETHER

DEATH MUST OCCUR WrrHmN ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF AccmET--The Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of Hilberg v. Industrial Commission' had occasion, for the first time since its passage, to construe the
1939 amendment to the section of the Workmen's Compensation Act
dealing with the time within which claims for compensation could be
filed with the Industrial Commission. 2 The husband of the plaintiff therein was injured in the course of his employment on April 27, 1937. Notice
of accident and claim for compensation were duly made, an award
entered, and a lump sum settlement paid February 2, 1938. Hilberg died
on October 26, 1939, as a result, or so it was claimed, of his accidental
injury. On November 4, 1939, his widow filed application for compensation for death. An arbitrator dismissed the application and the Industrial
Commission affirmed the dismissal. A writ of error to the Circuit Court
of Cook County, which had confirmed the order of the Commission
upholding the arbitrator's finding, brought the case to the Supreme Court.
Before the amendment in question, the act had provided that application for compensation had to be filed with the Industrial Commission
within one year from the date of the "injury" or within one year from
741 (1891); Sullivan v. Leckie, 60 Iowa 326, 14 N.W. 355 (1882); 31 Am. Jur.,
Judgments, § 328; 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, § 180.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, §§ 18, 20, and 23.
12 Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Ill. 170, 29 N.E. 563 (1892).
1 380 Ill.
102, 43 N.E. (2d) 671 (1942).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 161, which reads:

"...

Provided, that in any

case, unless application for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission
within one year after the date of the accident, where no compensation has been
paid, or within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation,
where any has been paid, the right to file such application shall be barred;
Provided, further, that if the accidental injury results in death within said year,
application for compensation for death may be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the date of death, but not thereafter."
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the date of the last payment of compensation.3 The section did not
expressly mention compensation for death. The Illinois Supreme Court,
in Burke v. Industrial Commission,4 held that in case of death caused
by an accidental injury the section meant that application for death
compensation could be filed within one year from the date of death even
though that was not within one year from the date of the accident nor
within one year from the date of the last payment of compensation. The
court then felt that the death of the injured employee entitling his dependents to compensation was the injury to them and that that was the
injury referred to in the act. Under that decision an application for death
compensation might be filed several years after the accident and after
the last payment of injury compensation. Shortly after the decision was
handed down the legislature adopted the amendment referred to above.
It followed rather closely the previous language as to application for
compensation and then added a provision that in case of death within
"said year" application for death compensation must be filed within one
year from the date of death.
In the instant case the court affirmed the circuit court, holding that
the phrase "within said year" obviously referred to the year in which
the employee could file an application for compensation for the injury.
The court found that the legislative intent was to make specific the time
beyond which an employer would not be liable for compensation for
death resulting from an accident, and that, to accomplish that intent,
the act must mean that death must occur within one year from the date
of the accident or from the date of the last payment of compensation
and that application must be made within one year from the date of
death. In view of the change in the language of the act from "injury" to
"accident" after the Burke case, and the addition of the clause expressly
referring to application for compensation for death, it would seem that
the court came to a correct conclusion as to the meaning of the amendment.
G. AzRn
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 161 read: "...
Provided, that in any case,
unless application for compensation is filed with the industrial commission within
one year after the date of the injury or within one year after the date of the
last payment of compensation, the right to file such application shall be barred."
4 368 III. 554, 15 N.E. (2d) 305, 119 A.L.R. 1152 (1938).

